: Rebounding from the 1941 winter disaster, German forces secured massive victories at Sevastopol and Kharkov, encircling entire Soviet armies.
In his seminal work, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 , historian Robert M. Citino argues that the year 1942 was not just a turning point in World War II, but the final gasp of a centuries-old "German way of war". While 1941’s failure at Moscow hinted at the end, 1942 was when the traditional Prussian tactics of maneuver ( Bewegungskrieg ) finally collapsed under the weight of modern industrial warfare. The Illusion of Victory Death of the Wehrmacht :The German Campaigns of...
Despite these wins, Citino identifies several fatal flaws that led to the "death" of the Wehrmacht as an effective fighting force: : Rebounding from the 1941 winter disaster, German
: The traditional Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics)—which allowed subordinate commanders great flexibility—was strangled by Hitler's increasing micromanagement and the rise of radio communication, which gave high command a "tight leash" on tactical movements. While 1941’s failure at Moscow hinted at the
: By 1942, Germany lacked the resources to launch offensives across the entire Eastern Front. They narrowed their focus to the southern sector (Operation Blue) to seize oil and grain, but even this limited goal proved too vast.